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JUDICIAL CODES OF CONDUCT AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF AN ELECTED JUDICIARY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH IN THE ELEVATION OF JUDGES
JUDICIAL CODES OF CONDUCT AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST
OF AN ELECTED JUDICIARY:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH IN THE ELEVATION OF JUDGES
LLB (University of London),
LLM (University of London), Gray’s Inn, PhD Candidate,
University of Sussex (United Kingdom)
The apparent bias vitiates the decision of the judge in common law systems. This is
particularly relevant where judges are elected as in the US and it has implications for faith
in an impartial judiciary. In some states of the US the judges are elected and their decisions
have led to appeals in the Supreme Court on grounds the decision was tainted with bias
and the due process clause of the US constitution to be invoked. The dissatisfaction with
an electoral based judiciary at state level has caused the issue of recusal to be viewed in
the context of the election system because its potential to cause a conflict of interest. The
question is whether the politicisation of the judiciary can lead to justice for all in the legal
framework and when judges are elected rather than appointed is the political bias inevitable?
This paper analysis the US judicial Code and its implications and compares it with the UK
system where is an independent appointment of judges, and it argues that despite its electoral
system makes judges in the US more accountable than those selected confidentiality by the
appointments system in the UK.
Keywords: ABA Model Rules; FCR 455; Canons 1–5; judicial election; pecuniary interest;
recusal; merits based selection.
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Information about the author
Zia Akhtar (Sussex, United Kingdom) – LLB (University of London), LLM (University
of London), Gray’s Inn, PhD Candidate, University of Sussex (United Kingdom)
(Sussex House, Brighton, East Sussex, BN1 9RH, United Kingdom; e-mail: pflawgraduate@
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